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CIVIL COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF KINGS: HOUSING PART G
-----------------------------------------------------------------X
1785 BROADWAY REALTY CORP
L&T Index No.

309793/21

Petitioner,
-againstDECISION/ORDER
NATHAN CHARLES
Respondent-Tenant,
“JOHN DOE,” “JANE DOE”
1233 ST JOHNS PLACE APT 1C
BROOKLYN, NY 11213
Respondents-Undertenants,
-----------------------------------------------------------------X
Present: Hon. KIMBERLEY SLADE
Judge, Housing Court
Recitation, as required by C.P.L.R. § 2219(a), of the papers considered in the review of this
motion to dismiss pursuant to §3211(a)(8) for lack of personal jurisdiction
The papers considered in these motions are contained on NYSCEF entries 23 through 28 and
passim.
This holdover proceeding was commenced in October 2021. After being calendared in
the court’s intake part, respondent filed a hardship declaration. Upon expiration of the hardship
stay respondent filed an ERAP application in January of 2022, which triggered a further stay of
this proceeding. Petitioner then moved by order to show cause to vacate the ERAP stay and the
court granted that motion. Respondent now moves to dismiss the petition pursuant to CPLR
3211(a)(8) alleging that petitioner failed to employ the due diligence standard required at the
time of service of the notice of petition and petition and thus there is no personal jurisdiction.
Petitioner opposes the motion.

1

The Covid-19 Emergency Eviction and Foreclosure Prevention Act (“CEEFPA”) was in
effect at the time this matter was commenced. CEEFPA, 2021 NY Chapter 417 Part C Subpart
A Section 3 provides that “[s]ervice of the notice of petition with the attached copies of the
hardship declaration and affidavits shall be made by personal delivery to the respondent, unless
such service cannot be made with due diligence, in which case service may be made under
section 735 of the real property actions and proceedings law.” Respondent argues that
petitioner’s service of the notice of petition and petition does not comport with the requirements
of the due diligence standard.
Due diligence is determined on a case-by-case basis, focusing not on the quantity of the
attempts at personal delivery, but on their quality (see Estate of Waterman v Jones, 46 AD3d at
66 [2007]). For the purpose of satisfying the "due diligence" requirement of CPLR 308 (4), it
must be shown that the process server made genuine inquiries as to the defendant's whereabouts
and place of employment (Estate of Waterman. Id. internal citations omitted).
According to the affidavit of service, the process server attempted to personally deliver
the petition and notice of petition to the respondent at the subject premises on Monday
November 22, 2021 at 2:03 p.m., on Tuesday, November 23, 2021 at 6:39 p.m., and on
Wednesday November 24, 2021 at 9:49 a.m. After these three attempts were unsuccessful, the
process server affirms that he affixed a copy of the “notice of petition and petition and notice of
electronic filing and notice to tenant with declaration and attorney list” upon the final service
attempt on November 24, followed by a certified mailing. The affidavit of the process server
fails to state any specifics as to whether any inquiry was made as to the respondent’s routines or
whereabouts, whether it is known that respondent is working, unemployed or any other fact that
would shed light on the most likely time to find respondent at home to accept service.
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Petitioner’s opposition focuses on the specifics of the actual service made but remains silent as to
the “genuine inquiry” prong of the due diligence standard and indeed, does not speak to whether
any inquiry at all was made prior to attempting service. Additionally, while not specifically
required by the process server there is nevertheless no affidavit refuting respondent’s assertions
and they are therefore undisputed. Petitioner’s assertions that service was sufficient on its face
fails to address the question of what, if, or whether any genuine attempt to ascertain when
personal service was most likely to be accomplished. There is nothing in the motions or in the
affidavits that addresses the inquiry required to establish due diligence.
While there are cases that discuss the various time frames that constitute a facially
sufficient affidavit and the times within which service attempts are most likely to find a
respondent at home, this court does not determine that there is a specific formula or specific
parameters that are required in every case, but does follow the well-entrenched rule that the
attempts must be based upon a genuine inquiry as to a specific respondent. "The due diligence
requirement refers to the quality of the efforts made to effect personal service, and certainly not
to their quantity or frequency'" (Barnes v City of New York, 70 AD2d 580, 416 NYS2d 52
[1979], affd 51 NY2d 906, 415 NE2d 979, 434 NYS2d 991 [1980] (other citations omitted).
Due diligence is not established if there is no evidence of any genuine inquiry made as to
respondent’s whereabouts (See Serrarro v Staropoli 94 AD3d at 1084, McSorley v Spear 50
Ad3d at 654).
Absent a genuine inquiry designed to learn when personal service is likely to be effective
it would be difficult to ascertain the likelihood that a respondent would be home during the
service attempts in this proceeding. An inquiry would procure additional information as to the
respondent’s employment and what his day-to-day life looks like – whether he commutes, works
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from home, is unemployed, volunteers, etc. Alternatively, were an attempt made and nothing
ascertained the server would at least be able to elaborate upon his or her inquiries. Here, there is
no information as to any "genuine inquiries about the defendant's whereabouts and place of
employment" Estate of Waterman v Jones, 46 AD3d 63, (2007) before the process server
resorted to nail and mail service. Therefore, while the court does not find that the times specified
in the affidavit of service are facially sufficient or insufficient it does find that in the absence of
any information or response from petitioner detailing facts related whether a genuine inquiry was
made that petitioner has not met the due diligence standard. Respondent’s motion is granted and
the petition is dismissed without prejudice to the commencement of a new proceeding.
Parenthetically, the court notes that it does not find that these attempts of service were
certainly during “commuting hours” or “working hours” as argued by respondent. That
argument oversimplifies the assessment of a genuine inquiry. For instance, a live away home
care attendant may only be home on weekends. Unless a petitioner was aware of this, any
attempts at personal service would likely be ineffective during weekdays. Additionally, while
respondent argues that the likelihood of successful service near Thanksgiving was less likely to
be successful, that again relies upon assumptions that may or may not be correct and it is just as
likely that people are home preparing for a holiday as they are travelling.

Dated: Brooklyn, New York
August 26, 2022
________________________________
Kimberley Slade, JHC
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